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EU-Russian Relations:                              
Evolution and Theoretical Assessment      
I. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the new millennium, various initiatives have been 
taken to promote EU-Russian relations. In this context, a triangle centered 
around the capitals of Berlin, Paris and Moscow may be of particular inter-
est as a driving force for the evolution of EU-Russian relations. The initia-
tives have also been criticized for going too far in accommodating Russian 
interests while neglecting the interests of other EU-partners. The first tri-
angle meeting of this kind took place in 2003 with German Chancellor 
Schröder, French President Chirac and Russian President Putin airing criti-
cism of the US war in Iraq. This meeting was criticized on both sides of the 
Atlantic. It was followed by further triangle meetings in 2004 and 2006. 
Leadership changes in all three countries, the fallout of the Russo-Georgian 
war in 2008 and Western critique on growing authoritarianism in Russia 
have put further activities on hold. All the more surprising was a new meet-
ing of the Berlin-Paris-Moscow triangle in October 2010, attended by 
German Chancellor Merkel, French President Sarkozy and Russian Presi-
dent Medvedev in the run-up to the NATO-Russia Council meeting in No-
vember 2010. 
 
Against the backdrop of these recent developments, I will argue that the 
evolutionary process of EU- Russian relations has incorporated the differ-
ent conclusions made by three scholars who have different theoretical per-
ceptions. Because of this, the ongoing developments should be evaluated Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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using an academic approach to understand them more broadly from a criti-
cal and objective position. Thus, the literature review was also made in 
conjunction with the core argument of the paper.  
 
In the main text of the paper, attention was given to three articles concern-
ing EU- Russian relations. In accordance with their theoretical framework, 
their contexts were analysed. The articles present different descriptive nar-
rations of EU-Russian relations as a result of their theoretical differences 
on the issue. Hence, the three articles give different viewpoints on the same 
subject. 
 
However, the final analysis of this article and its conclusion are made 
through a general assessment of the three articles. Instead of criticising 
their theoretical context preferences, the consistency between the current 
developments in the relations and the theoretical claims of the three articles 
is questioned. So, this paper provides an opportunity to comprehend the 
current direction of EU-Russian relations on the basis of different schools 
of thought.  
 
II. Key Facts on the Relations between                         
the EU and Russia 
The relations between Russia and the EU have a historical background as a 
result of many factors. This relationship differs from the classical under-
standing of foreign policy relationships because of the EU’s status as a su-
pra-national organization of 27 members. Accordingly, EU-Russian 
relations should be evaluated as 27 member states’ individual relations with 
Russia. At the same time we must look at the relations between the EU 
Commission and the governmental structures in Russia responsible for 
conducting foreign affairs, i.e. the Kremlin and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Before the EEC was transformed into the EU with the signing of the Maas-
tricht Treaty and before the dissolution of the Soviet Union into the Com-
monwealth of Independent States including Russia, Soviet Premier Mikhail 
Gorbachev implied the direction of the mutual relations between the Euro-
pean nations and the Soviet bloc. In his speech, Gorbachev put emphasis on 
‘the Common European Home’.
1  
 
In this foreign policy formulation, the Soviet strategy was based on the di-
mension of change in the Transatlantic relations between the USA and 
Europe. Due to the fact that the US has a military presence with bases in 
European countries, Gorbachev considered integrating the USSR into the 
European system while excluding the US. To benefit from the leadership 
competition between the US and France, the Soviet Union sought an oppor-
tunity to create friction in Transatlantic relations. Indeed, the Soviet Union 
tried to exploit the fact that they were geographically part of Europe while 
the US was not.  
 
As a consequence of the change in Soviet strategy, countries such as Po-
land, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria gained more auton-
omy from Moscow. The policy also eased the German question which had 
existed since the Berlin Blockade of 1948. The relevant process ended with 
German unification on October 3, 1990. The Soviet policy became a posi-
tive influence on the British, French, Italian and Scandinavian perspectives 
regarding the German unification.       
 
Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev focused on the internal problems of the 
USSR and enhanced policies to solve them in a sustainable way. However, 
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) 
did not provide a solution to the existing problems of the Soviet Union in 
 
1 Margot Light with Roy Allison, “The Place of Europe in Russian Foreign Policy”, in: 
Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe, Edited by Roy Allison, Margot Light and 
Stephen White, (Chatham House: London 2006), p.2.  Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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spite of the radical precautions taken vis-à-vis possible fundamental 
changes in the internal structure. Instead, the process resulted in the disso-
lution of the USSR on December 8, 1991 with the common decision of the 
Presidents of Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus. Furthermore, the USSR was 
replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on the 11th 
December 1991.
2   
 
The dramatic shift in the Soviet camp instantly affected the whole interna-
tional structure deeply. Not only the former members of the Soviet bloc, 
but also the US and Europe faced new international conditions which were 
influenced by the new developments. Thus, the EEC and later the EU had 
to formulate new policies in a variety of fields vis-à-vis Russia which con-
tinues to occupy a permanent seat in lieu of the USSR on the United Na-
tions Security Council.  
 
Russia in the beginning of the 1990s was experiencing a tough economic 
situation. The 1989 ‘Agreement on Trade and Commercial Economic Co-
operation’ granted most favoured nation status to the Soviet Union and the 
subsequent Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (TACIS) Programme was accepted to support the transition process 
to an open market economy together with a democratic society in 1991, the 
existing arrangements between the EEC and Russia were not enough for 
Russia to overcome the new economic position of the country. Here politi-
cal considerations had a decisive role on whether to deepen economic aid 
or not. To illustrate, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
was concluded between the EU and Russia to foster trade and investment, 
as well as create the conditions to establish a future free trade area between 
 
 
2 Lecture notes of 2nd March 2009 taken in the lecture by Assoc. Professor Oktay Tan-
sısever at Middle East Technical University. EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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the EU and Russia.
3 But its ratification was delayed until December 1, 1997 
due to protests regarding the Russian position and policies during the War 
in Chechnya.  
 
In addition to the economic aspect of EU-Russian relations, the security 
matters remained an open question following the end of the Cold War. 
Whereas the Warsaw Pact- the military wing of the Soviet Bloc- was dis-
solved, the rival military organization of the Western bloc, NATO, still ex-
ists. During the 1990’s, the members of NATO seriously discussed the 
future of the alliance. According to Professor Hyde-Price, in the develop-
ment of the debate, four possible forms of security for Europe were pro-
posed: NATO and an ‘Atlanticist’ Europe, a West European Defence 
Community, the CSCE and a Pan-European Collective Security System, 
and L’Europe des Etats (the States of Europe).
4 Regarding the final deci-
sion of the discussions, it can be claimed that Anglo-American Atlanticist 
view has had an edge over the others. 
 
In line with these developments, Russia has preferred to apply the Near 
Abroad Policy to present its clear concentration on the regions and issues 
dealing with its prior sphere of influence and with the impact of the Rus-
sian minorities in the neighbouring countries in the former Soviet Repub-
lics. Russia has therefore had understandable hesitations regarding the 
future of NATO since it has been proven contrary to the Russian offer for a 
European security structure via a Pan-European Collective Security System 
such as the OSCE. However, the Atlanticist camp has gained some suc-
cesses such as the general acquiescence to NATO enlargement.  
 
 
3 Margot Light with Roy Allison, The Place of Europe in Russian Foreign Policy, in: 
Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe, Edited by Roy Allison, Margot Light and 
Stephen White, (Chatham House: London 2006), p.6. 
4 Adrian Hyde-Price, European Security beyond the Cold War: Four Scenarios for the 
Year 2010, (SAGE Publications: London 1991), p.193.   Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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Concerning NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia has 
had worries about its security. Cooperation between Russia and NATO has 
however been accelerated by Russia joining the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC) in 1992 and then joining the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC) in 1997.
5 In addition, Russia was involved within the 
framework of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994 which engaged non-
member states in practical cooperation with the Alliance. Nonetheless, 
Russia is not taking part in the decision-making mechanism of NATO. The 
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council of 1997 and later NATO-Russia 
Council (NRC) of 2002 have been nothing more than an advisory mecha-
nism between NATO and Russia.  
 
In fact, a series of political differences also became influential in the secu-
rity relations between the EU and Russia. For example, the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union helped to trigger the dissolution of Yugoslavia during the 
early1990s. As a result of a bloody civil war in the region, many people 
were killed or displaced from their home countries. In the conflict, the lead-
ing actors showed different reactions to the development. However, 
NATO’s role in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its operation against the Serbs 
and their installations in Bosnia-Herzegovina were harshly opposed by the 
Russian politicians. Furthermore, the Kosovo issue appeared in the interna-
tional arena as an open question until its final independence on February 
17, 2007. The new state was recognized by the Western powers including 
many EU members even though Russia rejected its independence and as-
serted that Western recognition was a double-standard because Abkhazian 
and South Ossetian claims for independence went unacknowledged by the 
West.         
 
 
5 Margot Light with Roy Allison, The Place of Europe in Russian Foreign Policy, in: 
Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged Europe, Edited by Roy Allison, Margot Light and 
Stephen White, (Chatham House: London 2006), p.4. EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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One of the most important aspects in the security relations between the EU 
and Russia is the evolution of the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) within the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) stemming 
from the St. Malo Summit of 1998 between the British and French leaders. 
Even if the ESDP, the successor of the European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI) was formulated within the context of NATO, the European 
side of NATO has begun to increase its role in the alliance. It has brought a 
new dimension to EU-Russian relations.  
 
There have been many EU-Russia summits which have incorporated the 
EU Troika and Russia half-yearly meetings. In the definition of the agenda, 
Russia has increased its share of decision making with Vladimir Putin’s 
rise to power first as Prime Minister and later as President. The Summits 
have brought several important results. To illustrate, the Seventh EU-
Russia Summit held in Moscow in 2001 covered the Russian decision to 
change switch to the Euro from the US dollar as its unit of exchange in for-
eign trade especially with EU members. Furthermore there has been an 
emergence of a common European economic space improving the mutual 
economic relations. The Summits also paved the way for the concept of 
“four common spaces” defined as economic; freedom, security and justice; 
external security; science and education including cultural aspects accepted 
by both sides in 2004.
6 In addition, the nineteenth Summit held in Samara, 
Russia from the 17
th to the 18
th of May 2007 concluded the preparations for 
a new EU-Russia agreement. At the twentieth Summit in Portugal in Octo-
ber 2007, investment dialogue, energy early warning system and the World 
Trade Organization Accession (WTO) of Russia were discussed.
7 So, the 
EU-Russia Summits have played a crucial role in the definition of mutual 
relations so far. 
 
 
6 V. Likhachev, Russia and the European Union, International Affairs, p.110-111.  
7 Lecture notes of 23rd March 2009 taken in the lecture by Assoc. Professor Oktay Tan-
sısever at Middle East Technical University. Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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Of particular importance to the European economies is the energy issue. 
According to the Working Group Report of the Centre for European Poli-
tics Studies in 2001, the foreign energy dependency of the EU will be 
around 70 per cent during the 2020s and 2030s.
8 The Press Release by the 
EU Commission verifies the result of the Report: in 2030, the energy de-
pendency on external countries is expected to be 65 per cent.
9 On this point, 
Çağdaş Ergün underlines the energy supply security for EU-Russian rela-
tions and states that the EU energy policy requires the energy security in a 
sustainable way since 90 per cent of the imported natural gas, for example, 
comes from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.
 10 To 
support his argument, it is noteworthy to remember that almost 59.5 per 
cent of the natural gas need is imported from Russia to European countries 
such as Germany and Poland, and accordingly Russia is able to control 
many major energy routes such as Druzhba pipeline and Primorsk port to 
Europe. In addition, there are various energy projects between Russia and 
European countries which foreshadow long-term energy plans: For exam-
ple, there is the Nord Stream Project between Russia and Germany through 
the Baltic States and Poland, as well as the South Stream Project between 
Russia and Bulgaria. Thus, Russia- the leading energy supplier to the EU - 
and the EU whose energy dependency is dramatically increasing regard it 
mutually beneficial to cooperate in the fields of energy. They prefer to have 
stable relations so as not to affect their vital interests in a negative manner.  
 
Nonetheless, EU-Russian relations have also experienced conflicts of inter-
est. Margot Light summarizes the controversial topics as the border issues, 
the Northern Dimension, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) and ‘soft’ secu-
rity issues, and adds general problems such as the War in Chechnya and the 
Extension of the PCA to the accession states.
11  
 
8 Nyquist, C.E., Egenhofer, E. & Legge, T., Security of Energy Supply: A Question for 
Policy or the Markets?, Brussels, November 2001, p.9.  
9 http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/president/focus/energy_en.htm (accessed on 
30 May 2009). 
10 Ergün, Ç.E., Avrupa Birliği Enerji Hukuku, (Çakmak Yayınevi: Ankara 2007), p.10.  
11 Margot Light.  EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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First, on the issue of borders, the demarcation of the frontiers between Rus-
sia and the Baltic States which are today EU members remained a question 
after the demise of the Soviet Union. Additionally, the visa regime and the 
status of Kaliningrad became other topic points in the relations. In particu-
lar, Russia had problems with Lithuania regarding these issues. Neverthe-
less, a final compromise was achieved in 2002, and the Russians became 
able to transit Lithuania to travel to and from Kaliningrad under a Facili-
tated Rail Transit Document and Facilitated Transit Document scheme be-
ing free of charge to them.
12       
 
Second, the Northern Dimension was adopted in 1998 by the EU as an ini-
tiative to foster the relations between the EU, Russia and the Baltic States 
by means of priority areas of cooperation including economics, infrastruc-
ture, human needs, environment and soft security. However, the foreseen 
purposes have not been fulfilled because of the lack of available finance. 
On the other hand, some countries such as Poland focused more on the 
Eastern Dimension to develop their relations principally with Ukraine and 
Belarus. So, the Northern Dimension has become insufficient to satisfy the 
needs in the previously mentioned fields.  
 
Third, illegal immigration and environmental issues were taken into ac-
count in the mutual relations in the framework of the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement (PCA). The EU side assessed the soft security threats 
from Russia as ‘nuclear safety, environmental pollution, the fight against 
crime, including drug trafficking and illegal migration and the spread of 
diseases’ in the Country Strategy for the Russian Federation of 2003 by the 
European Commission.
13 The TACIS Programme of 1991 can be thought 
of as a complementary instrument working in accordance with EU defini-
 
12 Margot Light. 
13 Ibid. Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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tions in order to overcome the emerging problems in these fields following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
 
As for the general problems, the War in Chechnya caused serious troubles 
for the Moscow administration not only within the boundaries of the Rus-
sian Federation, but also in the international arena. Its efforts to solve the 
problem were heavily criticized by the West.
14 Accordingly, the outbreak of 
the War in 1994 had negative effects on EU-Russian relations. The ratifica-
tion process of the PCA was postponed until 1997. Similarly, the EU pre-
ferred to use sanctions such as the suspension of TACIS when Moscow 
administration the second war in Chechnya. Conversely, September 11 be-
came a turning point in the perception on the War in Chechnya. Interna-
tional terrorism and the fight against it were consi-dered a sort of 
justification and President Putin mentioned that Russia was fighting against 
terrorists in Chechnya who had ties to radical Islamic groups.  
 
Second, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement has brought about fur-
ther discussions between the EU and Russia as a result of the EU enlarge-
ment in 2004 covering ten new states.
15 Because the Agreement includes 
mutual privileges which have important economic gains, the enlargement 
process increased the scope of beneficiaries. Therefore, the Russian side of 
the Agreement claimed that there was an economic loss as a result of the 
expansion of the Agreement in terms of the number of countries. The Rus-
sians alleged that high standards for products including environmental pro-
tection measures and anti-dumping measures adversely affected the 
Russian economy; however, the EU side claimed that the lowering of cus-
toms duties on Russian goods in the new member states from 9 per cent to 
 
14 İlyas Kamalov, Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası: Moskova’nın Rövanşı, (Yeditepe: 
İstanbul 2008), p.9. 
15 These states are Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Malta, the Greek Cyp-
riot Administration, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia.  EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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4 per cent had a positive impact on the Russian economy regarding the ex-
portation of products and the increasing of its trade surplus.
16   
 
Third, energy security has continued to maintain its vitality which has im-
plied mutual dependency. A large proportion of natural gas is imported 
from Russia. Therefore Russia has received a large amount of income from 
the EU countries. However, the recent developments have accelerated en-
ergy security and its variety in terms of its import from outside of the Un-
ion. In 2006, Russian natural gas distribution company Gazprom claimed 
that due to a rise in the price of natural gas on the international markets, 
they would dramatically increase the price of natural gas sold to Ukraine. 
This decision quadrupled natural gas prices for consumers in the Ukraine, 
causing a political conflict between Russia and Ukraine to emerge.
17 As a 
result of the crisis, the EU members demanded guarantees for energy secu-
rity to avoid any kind of crisis on this issue similar to Ukraine; Russia re-
sponded to the EU with ‘demand guarantee’.
18 
 
In short, the relations between the EU and Russia have a variety of mutual 
dimensions which are quite useful in the formulation of bilateral relations. 
The dimensions are essential in comprehend the nature of relations since 
the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. Each factor must 
therefore be evaluated as it connects to other issues, and the analysis of the 
three articles covering with different schools of thought will be made with 
this in mind.    
 
16 Margot Light. 
17 Roy Ellison, Margot Light and Stephen White, Putin’s Russia and the Enlarged 
Europe, (Chatham House: London 2006), p.66. 
18 İlyas Kamalov, Putin Dönemi Rus Dış Politikası: Moskova’nın Rövanşı, (Yeditepe: 
İstanbul 2008), p.346. Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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III. Three Theoretical Approaches                                     
to EU-Russian Relations 
(a)   Paul Flenley
19 presents a pragmatic way of understanding of the relations 
between the EU and Russia. In his analysis, basic realist assumptions are 
used to comprehend the mutual relations. The national interest concept 
plays a fundamental role in analyzing the structure/nature of the relations. 
The maximization of interests and needs has a top priority and President 
Putin’s policy approach for example is named ‘new pragmatism’ because 
of these realities. To clarify, Flenley states that “To understand this article 
places the EU-Russian relationship in the wider context of the revolution-
ary changes in Russian foreign and security policy made under Vladimir 
Putin since 2000. In particular it examines the motivations behind and the 
key ingredients of Putin’s “new pragmatism” in foreign policy. In spite of 
continuing rhetoric about “norms” and building common spaces between 
the EU and Russia, the contemporary relationship is based on a much more 
realistic understanding of mutual interest and needs.”
20  
 
In line with his perception, he put emphasis on Russian and the EU’s inter-
est in having good relations. In that regard, the realistic paradigm on the 
superior role of the sovereign state prevails because the bilateral relations 
between Russia and the EU member states in addition to the EU Commis-
sion reflect the nature of relations on the state level and confirms the neore-
alist claim that the state still has the predominant position in international 
relations even though there are new actors whose influence cannot be ig-
nored. Meanwhile, the article focuses on a number of key contradictions in 
the relationship which prevent widespread integration between the EU and 
 
19 Paul Flenley, Russia and the EU: A Pragmatic and Contradictory Relationship, Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society, 6:3, Koninklijke Brill NV: Leiden 2005. 
20 Ibid., p.436.  EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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Russia. Thus, Flenley defines the relationship as the ‘Premature Partner-
ship’.
21   
 
Flenley begins his study with the relations soon after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The EU and Russia experienced difficulties in their new 
partnership. The programme of ‘westernization’ which contained internal 
economic reforms leading to a more stable market economy and reorienta-
tion in the Russian foreign policy did not have the immediate desired re-
sults. Crow explains that Russia felt it was being treated as a junior partner 
of the West; Russia was to be consulted but not to share in real decision-
making.
22  
 
In particular the field of security according to Flenley was perceived as a 
failure and humiliation. He emphasizes that those Russian expectations re-
garding the development of new security architecture for Europe based on 
such an institution as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) which had crossed the Cold war divide were not satisfied; 
instead, the military structure of the Western camp during the Cold War, 
NATO, has maintained its existence with redefined missions.
23 The Euro-
pean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was derived from the ESDI 
within NATO. To Flenley, the Russian foreign and security policy has un-
dergone a qualitative and revolutionary change in many ways with the 
coming of Vladimir Putin. He explains that there are several reasons for the 
situation. Initially, the crisis in relations with the West proved the old for-
eign policy was counterproductive and if anything had detracted from Rus-
sia’s security as seen in the case of Mikhail Gorbachev’s New Thinking.  
 
21 Paul Flenley, Russia and the EU: A Pragmatic and Contradictory Relationship, Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society, 6:3, Koninklijke Brill NV: Leiden 2005, 
p.437. 
22 S. Crow, Why has Russia Foreign Policy Changed?, RFE/RL Research Report, 3 (18) 
6 May 1994, p.3.  
23 Paul Flenley, Russia in the New Europe, in Europe: the Cold Divide, Edited by F. 
Carr, (Macmillan: London 1998), p.107. Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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Second, the major threat to the security of Russia comes not from the West 
and NATO but from along her southern belt. In particular, radical trans-
formation of regimes in the Middle East, the instability of former Soviet 
states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, tension in the nuclearised 
southern Asia states and the threat of terrorism have been defined as pri-
mary security threats.
24  
 
Third, there was a fact that US increased its unilateralism and its reassess-
ment of the relationship with Russia in 2000-2001. To Flenley, Russia was 
no longer seen as an equal partner meaning the significance of the relation-
ship could be downgraded for American policymakers. In that regard, the 
republican administration under the leadership of George W. Bush from 
2001 on operated in a more unilateral way including its abrogation of the 
1972 ABM Treaty in December 2001. Flenley noted that President Putin 
was not prepared for unilateral act of the US administration. So, pragma-
tism rather than the assumption that foreign policy could be based on Rus-
sia’s past superpower status should be chosen in following foreign policy 
implementations.
25  
 
Fourth, Flenley draws attention to the shift in the Russian foreign policy 
formulation from ‘a gradual but distinctive shift from a geo-political to 
geo-economic dimension’.
26 In this formulation, the EU became an inspira-
tion because it has been an economic giant and in its foreign policy has 
been a tendency to act as unified unit of 27 members in international set-
tings such as at the Doha Summit of the World Trade Organization. There-
fore, the economic instruments such as energy have had more priority in 
foreign policy.  
 
 
24 Paul Flenley, “Russia and the EU: A Pragmatic and Contradictory Relationship”, Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society, 6:3, Koninklijke Brill NV: Leiden 2005, 
p.439. 
25 Ibid. p.440. 
26 Ibid. EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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Another key element in the new pragmatism to Flenley, is that the new 
partnership has its limits. He says “This element involves Russia’s right to 
pursue an independent foreign policy. Under Putin there has been a re-
newed confidence in Russia and pride in its past both soviet and tsarist.”
27 
Flenley believes that understanding these elements of the new pragmatist 
way of Russian foreign policy provides a key to the relations between Rus-
sia and the EU. He takes the emphasis on economic priorities and the 
pragmatic pursuit of Russia’s immediate interests into account to explain 
the intensified relations since 2000. According to him, for both Russia and 
the EU, the European enlargement forced the mutual relations to turn from 
formalities and diplomatic practices into a practical way of relations to 
work out problems and clarify shared interests.
28  
 
Moreover, individual member states of the EU believe that they are able to 
pursue their own individual bilateral relations with Russia. In fact, Flenley 
asserts that “From the EU’s point of view the realization that the next phase 
of enlargement would not only turn Russia into a close neighbour but in-
corporate the former Soviet republics of the Baltic States meant that it had 
to develop a more coherent policy towards Russia.”
29 Accordingly, the Co-
logne European Council in June 1999 realized this and therefore adapted 
the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia. The commitment 
by the Council to the ESDP implied not only clarifications regarding secu-
rity relations with NATO including the US, but also with European coun-
tries outside of the EU including Russia.
30   
 
 
27 Paul Flenley, Russia and the EU: A Pragmatic and Contradictory Relationship, Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society, 6:3, Koninklijke Brill NV: Leiden 2005, 
p.441. 
28 Ibid., p.442. 
29 Ibid., p.443. 
30 Paul Flenley, Russia and the EU: A Pragmatic and Contradictory Relationship, Per-
spectives on European Politics and Society, 6:3, Koninklijke Brill NV: Leiden 2005, 
p.444. Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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From the Russian side, Flenley analyzes Russian foreign policy noting that 
it was clear it had to maintain relations with the EU which at the time were 
not sufficient due to the enlargement of the EU and deepening integration 
including the monetary union. While emphasizing the Foreign Policy con-
cept of the Russian Federation, he stresses that “With enlargement and with 
the development of a Common Foreign and Security it was becoming evi-
dent that the EU would have an impact on Russia in its own right. Russia 
would have to deal with an increasingly integrated union.”
31 
 
Flenley also focuses on the economic relationship and the limits of integra-
tion between Russia and the EU. To him, the common spaces are the reflec-
tion of the reality of a very practical relationship. Thus, an idea of a 
Common European Economic Space was a result of this kind of relation-
ship. Flenley viewed that for President Putin the strategy of building a close 
economic relationship with the EU was to the mutual benefit of both. In-
deed, the EU’s share of Russian exports had been approximately 46 per 
cent before the enlargement and right after the accession of the ten new 
members to the EU in 2004 was 54 per cent.
32 Hence, Flenley believes that 
through expansion of trade with the EU, Russia will be required to move 
closer to EU standards of products and services.  
 
But Flenley also points out that the potential for building anything wider in 
respect of a fully integrated Common Economic Space is restrained by a 
number of problems. In particular, the structural problems and the lack of 
competitiveness in the Russian economy cause problems which prevent 
further integrations between the Russian and European economies. Flenley 
says “There is a predominance of government-private forms of ownership. 
Business is still characterized by integrated business groups with their own 
internal financial structures including banks, marketing organizations and 
insurance companies. A whole ‘virtual economy’ exists based on webs of 
relationships between businesses and the government. Many businesses 
 
31 Ibid. EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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operate with losses , sustained by informal relationships and survival net-
works.”
33 Furthermore, the existence of corruption and the power of orga-
nized crime were defined as the main reasons for the limitations of eco-
nomic integration in a broader sense.  
 
In conclusion, Flenley draws a portrait of the relationship between the EU 
and Russia in a more realistic context. According to him, the EU seeks a 
coherent and reliable partner in line with mutual shared interests while 
Russia wishes a close relationship with the EU as a result of pragmatic and 
economic reasons. Russia also pursues relations independently with each 
European state depending on its own interests. Hence, Flenley states the 
Russian foreign Policy in terms of a “new pragmatism” formulated and im-
plemented by Putin. The perception of this pragmatism is evaluated in 
terms of Russian national interests. These interests include but are not li-
mited to maximization of power, economic recovery and preservation of 
territorial integrity vis-à-vis the EU. The perspective of Flenley in his 
analysis therefore reflects a realist perception regarding EU-Russian rela-
tions. 
 
 
(b)   Filippos Proedrou wrote an article called ‘The EU-Russia Energy Approach 
under the Prism of Interdependence’
34 whose basic theoretical argumenta-
tion was based on the interdependence theory put forth by many leading 
contemporary scholars such as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane. Under the 
framework of the neoliberal narration, the existence of conflict is accepted 
as a fundamental feature of world politics; accordingly, cooperation be-
tween the actors in the international system is to be encountered frequently 
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p.446-447. 
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and cannot be dismissed as insignificant or an interval between two wars. 
In fact, Proedrou claims his article is an effort to refute realist claims con-
cerning the nature of world politics and to make obvious that cooperation 
has become an established feature of international politics.
35 Hence, 
Proedrou states that “It (neoliberal assumption) instrumentalizes the no-
tions of sensitivity and vulnerability and assumes that the parties will coop-
erate or conflict with each other in accordance with their degree of 
sensitivity and vulnerability. Indeed, empirical data shows that while ele-
ments of conflict are present, cooperative schemes also take place and al-
low the maintenance and furtherance of the EU-Russia energy trade.”
36  
 
In his article, theoretical background is given a priority before he starts his 
analysis on the relations regarding energy between the EU and Russia. To 
begin with the anarchical structure of the international system, he presents 
the approaches of neoliberalism and neorealism. The Neoliberal form of 
anarchy rejects the neorealist position on anarchy which defines anarchy as 
the principle of the international system, and anarchy means the absence of 
a supranational authority to dictate its will on states. Instead, neoliberalism 
claims that war is not always probable in spite of the absence of a world 
government.  
 
In addition, Proedrou uses the arguments of Keohane and Charles Lipson to 
strengthen neoliberal discourse: “Neoliberals point to the inconsistency of 
the realist argument. Firstly, since realism considers states to be rational 
actors, it is a paradox that neo-realism expects states to act on the basis of 
mere uncertainty and not on the calculation of possibilities. Secondly, neo-
liberalism maintains that cooperation is possible, when the perceived bene-
fits are high and perceived costs low; therefore, it is the calculation of cots 
and benefits and not anarchy that will determine whether cooperation will 
 
35 Ibid., p.329.  
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be achieved. Thus, one cannot deduce from anarchy whether conflict or 
cooperation will emerge.”
37     
 
Following the theoretical explanations, Proedrou continues his article in 
order to prove that the model of interdependence fits with the energy rela-
tions between the EU and Russia because the EU and Russia are dependent. 
He uses Thomas Schelling’s definition of interdependence (Harvard 1960) 
which is described as ‘a situation where the ability of one side to fulfil its 
aims is highly dependent on the choices and decisions that the other side 
makes.’
38 Using this definition of interdependence, Proedrou explains the 
relationship between the EU and Russia. To him, the EU needs a large 
amount of energy which it imports primarily from Russia. Therefore, the 
EU is the principal market for Russia to export its energy. So, Russia 
makes a large amount of money and earns more valuable foreign currency 
which in turn boosts the Russian economy and helps it repay its interna-
tional debt.  
 
By consulting a report of the International Energy Agency (IEA), he em-
phasizes the increasing energy dependency of the EU on third party coun-
tries. To illustrate, the EU is expected to import approximately 81 per cent 
of its natural gas and 94 per cent of its oil by 2030.
39 He further explains the 
energy dependency with these numbers: The EU today imports 80 per cent 
of the total oil and 60 per cent of the total natural gas it consumes.
40 In view 
of the energy dependency of the EU, its mutual relations with Russia gains 
more importance. Because the Middle East has been very unstable for a 
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long period of time, Russia’s energy supplies make it an even more impor-
tant strategic partner. 
 
For the Russians, the energy sector is not only the most important source of 
income, but also a crucial dimension of its national security policy. 
Proedrou clarifies its importance for Russia in his own words: “It accounts 
for one quarter of its total GDP and just under one third of its total indus-
trial production, and contributes about half the income to the annual 
budget. Energy exports, which account for 54.5 per cent of total Russian 
exports, have been the crucial factor that explains the impressive annual 
rise of 6.5 per cent of Russian GDP for the years 2001-05.”
41 Robert Keo-
hane and Joseph Nye assert that interdependence does not always mean or 
necessitate cooperation between the sides. In fact, interdependence may 
cause serious conflicts between them. In this way, the problem of asymmet-
ric interdependence appears.
42 Moreover, Proedrou states that on both sides, 
there is the fear that the benefits they offer each other through their interde-
pendent relationship may be reduced. This can lead them to unilateral ac-
tion that will lessen their dependence on the other. This in turn accounts for 
the underlying conflict as these moves provoke a strong reaction from the 
other party. 
 
On this point, Proedrou notes that the EU has had a tendency to diversify 
its energy resources which results in a decrease in the level of energy de-
pendence on Russia. Russia perceives these attempts as a threat to its na-
tional interests. In short, the vulnerability of the EU and Russia can lead to 
friction, and Proedrou thinks that “The belligerent policies Russia pursues 
towards ‘new’ Europe are as a result of the latter’s high vulnerability.”
43  
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Proedrou also focuses on the ‘Russian Sensitivity’ which implies keeping 
the European market because it pays the highest price for energy such as 
natural gas. In accordance with the priority of energy issue, Russia tries to 
retain the existing agreements and contracts to preserve its primary status 
as a leading energy supplier. Furthermore, the Russian companies such as 
Gazprom pay close attention to the liberalization process in the European 
market. They pay particular attention to the energy market including 
emerging spot markets. Penetration of these markets is a vital goal for Rus-
sia to maintain high margins of profit. Therefore, Proedrou alleges that “the 
break-up of former state monopolies in the EU member-states and the sale 
of their parts give Gazprom good chances for acquiring assets that will so-
lidify its presence in the lucrative EU market.”
44  
 
As to the oil sector, Russia attempts to control the Caspian oil in terms of 
both energy routes and oil productions. Therefore according to Proedrou, 
the Kremlin raises obstacles to alternative routes and suppliers. He claims 
that whenever the plans to transport energy resources through the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa pipelines, Moscow creates obstructions to 
their implementation; in addition, Russia gives its support to secessionist 
movements in Georgia and aims at rendering the construction and function 
of pipelines through Georgian territory more risky.
45 Additionally, there is a 
consistency in the Russian strategy to dominate the targeted and purchased 
oil refineries and ports throughout Europe. Here, the former Warsaw Pact 
countries have a priority for Russia.
46 At the same time, Russia pursues a 
strategy to build its own infrastructure, and to acquire stakes in the energy 
infrastructure of the transit countries. In conclusion, the energy exports to 
the EU countries are a critical dimension of the Russian strategy to main-
tain its geopolitical and geostrategic importance, and for its economic re-
covery.  
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To Proedrou, the energy sector also has an essential role for Russia in terms 
of its security policy. Securing the energy routes is accepted as an indispen-
sible part of its overall security strategy. Indeed, the use of natural re-
sources is largely preferred in foreign policy implementation. The energy 
crisis between Russia and the Ukraine is a typical example. The policy can 
be annotated within the context of the Russian supremacy policy in ‘near 
abroad’. The policy also implies the restoration of the Russian status vis-à-
vis the US in the international arena. In his analysis, Proedrou claims that 
“Russia resisted the Western inspired ‘velvet’ revolutions in Ukraine and 
Georgia that established regimes friendly to the West. It retains the region 
in the Russian sphere of influence. Hence, Russia is also using its natural 
resources for this cause.”
47  
 
In line with its energy strategy, the construction of the north European 
natural gas pipeline has been at the top of the energy agenda of the Kremlin 
for a long time. With the project, Russia will be able to supply gas to the 
most lucrative markets of North-Western Europe bypassing transit coun-
tries such as the Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia and the Baltic States.
48 
It will reduce the Russian dependence on these countries. Meanwhile, 
Proedrou clarifies that “Russia expands into the European market through 
the purchases of assets in European gas distributions, oil refineries and 
ports. Gazprom now participates in gas distribution companies in a number 
of European countries. It boasts shares in distributors in the Ukraine, Bela-
rus, the Baltic States, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Hungary 
among others.”
49 Thus, shaping the future of energy plans between the EU 
countries and Russia as well as their relevant implementation processes 
have formed the primary goals of the Russian strategy.  
 
 
47 Ibid. 
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To sum up the interdependent nature of EU-Russian relations according to 
Proedrou, EU-Russian energy relations are in fact a cooperative relation-
ship. To cover the energy needs, most EU member-states import significant 
amounts of oil and gas from Russia. Both sides benefit from this kind of 
relationship in a broad sense. They cooperate on infrastructure develop-
ment of energy transportation projects and promote further energy projects 
enhancing their energy trade. However, it does not mean that there are no 
conflicting elements in the cooperative relations between the EU and Rus-
sia. Instead, they have mutual sensitivity due to their fears of facing an 
asymmetric maximization of their benefits. Nevertheless, this relationship 
which vacillates between cooperation and conflict can be explained through 
the prism of interdependence.
50 To Proedrou, neoliberalism presents a full-
fledged theory in terms of co-existence of cooperation and conflict. He 
points out that the dismissal of anarchy can allow cooperation to be 
achieved. On this point, uncertainty and relative gains do not necessarily 
come with absolute conflict between the EU and Russia. Indeed, the EU 
and Russia have created expectations and preferred to have absolute gains 
from cooperation.
51 So, Proedrou supports the interdependence concept in 
the context of a liberal discourse to explain the nature of relations between 
the EU and Russia while using the energy sector to prove his thesis.  
 
 
(c)  Kristian L. Nielsen wrote an article titled ‘Opportunities and Limitation for 
the Baltic States of the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership’
52 in order to ex-
plain the current mood of the relations between the EU and Russia by fo-
cusing on the experience of the Baltic States vis-à-vis Russia. Nielsen 
prefers supranationalism and intergovernmentalism to define the theoretical 
framework of his article. In particular, Nielsen’s argument benefits from 
the European integration history most notably, the evolution of the EEC 
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towards the EU. According to Nielsen, the EU has been a confusing mix of 
supranational and intergovernmentalist styles of integration throughout its 
history.
53 After explaining the EU experience within theoretical framework, 
Nielsen clarifies the ongoing relations with Russia on the basis of suprana-
tional and/or intergovernmental types of foreign policy preferences of the 
Baltic members. So, Nielsen concludes that a modest and multilateral kind 
of approach in the relations with Russia can surely bring better results for 
the Baltic States thus enabling them to benefit from the soft security issues 
that the EU provides.  
 
In his analysis, Nielsen begins with the decision-making mechanism of the 
EU in the field of foreign policy. In the general structure of the EU, Nielsen 
asserts that there are reflections of the supranational and intergovernmen-
talist schools of thought. The EU consists of three pillars and each pillar is 
made up of a mix of different government forms: “While there are varia-
tions inside especially the first and third pillars, and while several policy 
fields to some extent cut across this structure, it can generally be said that 
pillar I, which consists of the original economic communities, is governed 
supranationally…In contrast, the second pillar is entirely intergovernmen-
tal, with decisions being reached by unanimity, with only a very limited 
role for the Commission, and none for the EP or the ECJ. The Council 
maintains sole control, acting through its secretariat, the Secretary-General 
of which doubles as the EU’s High Representative for the Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP). The third pillar is mainly intergovern-
mental but with a strong role for the Commission in proposing, drafting and 
implementing proposals.”
54 Nielsen gives a priority to the analysis of the 
structure of the EU particularly the foreign-policy making process of the 
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EU. Understanding the nature of the formulation of EU foreign policy is 
also helpful to comprehend the foreign policy implementation of the EU.   
 
However, it does not mean that the EU has internal unity on every issue. 
Instead member states may prefer to act unilaterally or independently up to 
certain extent in their bilateral relations with third party non-EU countries. 
This is seen in the case of Russia because of their national interests in the 
energy sector. To Nielsen, the smaller states in the EU have traditionally 
favoured supranationalism. To support his claim, Nielsen quotes from 
Krok-Paszkowska and Zielonka (2005, p.154) that smaller states have a 
strong tendency to regard the supranational institutions as a sort of shield 
against being pressured by the larger countries.
55 Furthermore, Nielsen ad-
vances Andrew Moravcsik’s argument that the preferences of the ‘big 
three’ of France, Germany and the United Kingdom shape the integration 
process in the intergovernmental negotiating environment.
56 Using Krok-
Paszkowska, Zielonka and Moravcsik’s opinions, Nielsen summarizes the 
preference of the smaller states by referring to the Baltic countries desire 
for a supranational order to gain influence in foreign policy. Although 
Nielsen does not ignore past experience including the Fouchet Plan of 1962 
which was perceived as an instrument towards an intergovernmental politi-
cal community and blocked by the smaller members of the Community.     
 
After focusing on the foreign-policy making mechanism of the EU, Nielsen 
continues his article with the EU-Russia strategic partnership. Initially, 
Nielsen concentrates on the various perceptions of Russia in Europe. Niel-
sen uses a quotation from Estonian historian Kaido Jaanson who says that 
there is ‘one united Europe and 25 Russias’. To clarify the quotation from 
Jaanson, Nielsen states that “all European countries each have their histori-
cal relationship and hence their own perception of Russia, which influences 
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the way that they wish to see cooperation develop in future. This important 
point is quite visible in the way that the European Union and its members 
have approached their big neighbour to the East.”
57 Accordingly, Nielsen 
gives the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was 
signed between the European Union and Russia in 1994 to improve mutual 
relations, as an example. However, Nielsen reminds us that the PCA had to 
be ratified by all the member states of the EU, and this process did not end 
quickly and the Agreement did not enter into force until 1997 because 
some member states protested Russian conduct during the first war in 
Chechnya.  
 
In addition to the PCA, Nielsen regards the European Neighbourhood Pol-
icy of 2003 as another cornerstone in EU-Russian relations because Russia 
was not satisfied being treated as an equal to other smaller countries such 
as Moldova and Belarus. Rather, Russia wanted a ‘strategic partnership’ 
status to the EU. Similarly, the St. Petersburg Summit became a platform at 
which the EU started using the phrase ‘Strategic Partnership’ to define the 
nature of the relations with Russia. Furthermore the strategic partnership 
was envisaged to cover the four common spaces: “1) the Common Eco-
nomic Space, 2) the Common Space for Freedom, Security and Justice, 3) 
the Common Space on External Security, 4) the Common Space for Re-
search, Education and Culture.”
58 But the definition of the relations be-
tween the EU and Russia as ‘strategic partnership’ has not been the end of 
all problematic issues. For example, the EU has been critical of state-
owned business enterprises predominantly in the energy sector. All the 
while the EU has officially been supportive of Russian membership in the 
World Trade Organisation, and of the Russian efforts to fix its economy 
under the rules of market economy. To Nielsen, the EU Commission can 
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only play ‘bad cop’ since the EU member states have authorised the Com-
mission to do so.
59 
 
Afterwards, Nielsen analyses the Baltic States, European integration and 
Russia in terms of their impact on each other and their relations. Nielsen 
uses Vadim Kononenko’s argument (2006, p.69) on the Baltic States’ per-
ception of Russia: “The Baltic states did not fit neatly into either category. 
Their involuntary past association with Russia did give the Baltic States a 
feeling of having a special knowledge of that country and its people, which 
the rest of the EU would be well-advised to heed. However it would be 
wrong to say that this line of thinking has made the Baltic States take un-
duly negativist stances on EU cooperation with Russia.”
60 Based on the ar-
gument of Kononenko, Nielsen claims that the Baltic States have a 
tendency to externalize some of their national concerns to influence the di-
rection of EU policy. In other words, they try to lead the EU to pursue a 
type of policy to satisfy their national needs or priorities. This situation im-
plies a supranational form of foreign policy but Nielsen mentions the im-
portance of the European Neighbourhood Policy of 2003 (ENP), the 
adoption of four common spaces between the EU-Russian, and the ‘strate-
gic partnership’ nature of the relations. Thus, Nielsen emphasizes that the 
Baltic States have been satisfactorily successful in shaping the ENP within 
the framework of a strictly intergovernmental Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy (CFSP) context. 
 
Yet, Nielsen adds that “the EU’s intergovernmental parts remain rather 
slow-moving, not easily able to take ad-hoc decisions that fall outside of 
long-established policies. Then again, there are no rules without excep-
tion”
61 To support the argument, Nielsen focuses on the Orange Revolution 
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during which the EU showed some hesitations in defining the general char-
acteristics of the policy. Instead, Nielsen says that some countries such as 
Poland and Lithuania took individually initiative to mediate in the crisis.  
 
In the last part of the article, Nielsen asks if the EU provides the expected 
security. The membership of the three Baltic States in 2004 put focus on 
their foreign policy expectations. Nielsen clearly states that the realities of 
membership would be disappointing in some aspects, and asserts that 
“Even as they have moved from being the ‘Near Abroad’, relations have 
not quite turned to a ‘normal neighbourly’ mode either, and Russia has still 
been a menacing presence for the Baltic States, as some of the examples 
above have shown…The Baltic States have a clear interest in an as coop-
erative relationship with Russia as possible, and have found the EU a useful 
route to achieving some progress.”
62 In accordance with this purpose, Niel-
sen points out that the Baltic States have in the field of energy, recommend 
a united EU approach to Russia. However, Nielsen warns that the inter-
governmental aspects of the EU foreign policy cause looseness and leave 
too much room for Russia to exploit the existing situation.
63 
 
To analyse the EU foreign policy framework, Nielsen believes that the 
member states will not be in favour of the limitations to their foreign policy 
preferences. It does not however mean a kind of supranationalism without 
any limits. Rather, Nielsen advises that “the Baltic states should aim for the 
EU to clarify its policy positions more thoroughly, so as to eliminate doubts 
about their application and reduce the scope for confusion. Especially with 
Russia it is prudent to expect the unexpected, and be ready to take ad-hoc 
decisions.”
64 Nielsen meanwhile considers that the Baltic States have 
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gained intra-EU diplomacy experience, and learned how to be influential in 
the definition of the EU policies. 
 
In conclusion, Nielsen benefits from supranationalism and intergovernmen-
talism as theoretical frameworks to make his analysis on EU-Russian rela-
tions. In particular, Nielsen focuses on the Baltic States which became EU 
member in 2004. Consistent with European integration history which has 
included a confusing mix of supranational and intergovernmentalist styles, 
Nielsen pays attention to the three-year experience of the Baltic States. 
This experience has shown pro-supranational policies whereas the big 
three- France, the UK and Germany- have preferred more intergovernmen-
tal policy under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). Within the contexts of unilateral foreign policy based on national 
preferences and multilateral foreign policy, Nielsen tries to explain the con-
tradictory nature of foreign policy approaches of the Member States vis-à-
vis Russia particularly from the perspective of the Baltic States. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
EU-Russian relations have experienced a mixture of successes and failures 
since the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 
accordance with the theoretical stances used in assessing the relations, each 
perspective on the relations between the EU and Russia will be evaluated 
separately.    
 
To begin with, the article written by Paul Flenley, ‘Premature Partnership’ 
is widely accepted as the true nature of the relations. In the formulation of 
‘Premature Partnership’, the national interests have the leading role in its 
definition. Accordingly, the fulfilment of interests is the focal point in the 
structure of the mutual relations. Thus, the policy approach of Vladimir 
Putin, the former President of the Russian Federation, is described as ‘new 
pragmatism’ in the context of realities.  Derviş Fikret Ünal 
32   
 
However, it is noteworthy to remember that relations with Russia require 
long-term strategic thinking rather than just calculating short-term gains 
based on a cost-benefit analysis. With the recent developments of the 
Russo-Georgian War in August 2008, Russia again proved that the igno-
rance of Russia on its ‘Near Abroad’ can results in a serious miscalculation. 
It is important for any state to take Russian attitude and foreign policy pref-
erences into account.  Furthermore, even if Putin’s pragmatic perception is 
undeniable; Russian foreign policy cannot be explained in narrow sense. 
Instead, Russia has an imperial tradition which has led the Russian rulers to 
gain a wide range of power over political events, and the formation of poli-
cies which can render the Russians successful with both short and long 
term goals.  
 
Indeed, Russia has increased its foreign policy instruments. To illustrate, 
Russia became the eighth state in the previous G-7 consisting of the US, 
UK, Germany, France, Japan, Italy, Canada. Hence, the relations should 
not be considered only from the security perspective but also from that of 
energy security as well. Russia is getting stronger in economic terms, and 
has become important in shaping current events which have international 
importance. So, the maximization of power perception should not be limi-
ted to the field of security on which Flenley concentrated in his article or 
even to economic affairs such as the energy and security. In short, EU-
Russian relations should be thought of from a broader perspective oriented 
not only by the pragmatic way of thinking, but also by the long-term strate-
gic partnership.    
 
Second, the article by Proedrou supports his interdependence thesis to 
prove that the EU and Russia have mutual interests in cooperating with 
each other. Indeed, the current position of both sides leads them to mutual 
interdependence. On the other hand, bilateral relations cannot be based on 
the energy issue alone. The EU and Russia share a large scope of interest in 
many fields. Though the energy and security issue are extremely critical for EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
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both the EU and Russia, there are other crucial factors which define the di-
rection of the policies. For example, the security architecture of Europe fol-
lowing the end of the bipolar system in the world affairs has been a leading 
discussion topic among many actors. Despite the fact that NATO continues 
to exist and the ESDP has its origins in the ESDI derived from the NATO 
structure, there are some EU Member States such as France which wish to 
take more initiative in the security affairs of Europe. Following the disap-
pearance of the Warsaw Pact, Russia preferred a common European struc-
ture like the OSCE. Today, the enlargement of NATO remains a 
problematic issue in the relations between the EU and Russia. In fact, the 
recent debates on the deployment of early missile warning systems in the 
Czech Republic and Poland have elevated the importance of security mat-
ters between the EU and Russia even though the conflict was primarily be-
tween the USA and Russia.   
 
To analyse the level of interdependence, it is important to point out that 
some EU members such as Germany have preferred to improve special re-
lations with Russia. Even though Germany plays a fundamental role in the 
formulation and implementation of the CFSP, Germany does pursue inde-
pendent policies in line with its national interests. In particular, with regard 
to energy Germany and Russia decided to build a pipeline through the Bal-
tic Sea to transport the Russian natural gas to Germany. This policy prefer-
ence shows that the degree of interdependence changes from country to 
country. Portugal’s preference for interdependence is different than that of 
Germany or the Baltic States demonstrating that preferences are relative 
within the Union. 
 
Regarding the third article by Nielsen, it presents the different viewpoints 
of supranational and intergovernmentalist approaches in an effort to com-
prehend both European integration history and the nature of EU-Russian 
relations. The theoretical context of the Baltic States relationship with Rus-
sia is analyzed in depth. Nielsen does not concentrate on the impact of 
other actors instead Nielsen pays attention to either the nation-state per-Derviş Fikret Ünal 
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spective or institutional framework defined by the intergovernmentalist 
process of foreign policies. However, as seen in the Orange Revolution in 
the Ukraine, societal factors are also decisive not only on the national level 
but also in the definition of foreign policies. That is to say that there are 
many actors which have strong influence on the decision-making process 
of foreign policy within this framework the sovereign-nation state still has 
the predominant position. Hence, Nielsen has a state-centric evaluation of 
the relations avoiding the impact of other factors.  
 
In conclusion, EU-Russian relations have been a special field of focus for 
many scholars, analysts and strategists in addition to politicians. The rela-
tionship incorporates different dimensions such as security and energy is-
sues which allow for making assessments from various theoretical stances. 
Accordingly, this article examined EU-Russian relations since the end of 
the Cold War from the theoretical stance of realist, liberal, supranational 
and intergovernmentalist schools of thought. However, EU-Russian rela-
tions necessitate a broader perspective to understand the larger picture of 
relations due to the existence of the historical background of the relations 
as well as the capacities of both actors in terms of military power, eco-
nomic potentials, and their influence in international politics. Thus, the re-
lations between the EU and Russia have the peculiarity that each theoretical 
stance can be contributory to understand the nature of relations. There is no 
doubt that each theoretical framework should be taken into consideration in 
order to more broadly analyse relations. In conclusion, the issue of EU-
Russian relations is currently one of the most important discussion topics in 
the International Relations discipline due to its dynamic nature. These rela-
tions will have a strong impact on changing international conditions, and 
both actors will influence the future direction of world politics.  
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